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I.

INTRODUCTION

Universities are typically considered to have two complementary goals: providing
education and performing research. 1 While the determination of which objective
deserves primacy has long been debated and is not within the scope of this paper, it is
indisputable that productive research serves to further a university's goal of education,
both directly by adding to the body of knowledge to be dispensed to the students and
indirectly by increasing the university's prestige, thereby attracting lucrative grants,
quality students, and competitive faculty members to the university. 2 It is, at the very
least, safe to say that research is the heart of the academic system.
Standing between a university and its goal of research are two basic, but substantial, obstacles: lack of funding and lack of access. Although lack of funding is
fairly self-explanatory, a few statistics provide data on how important funding is to the
research arm of the academy. Research is a generally expensive pursuit, with primary
expenditures including equipment, materials, and labor costs. In 2002, an estimated
thirty-six billion dollars was spent on research activities at academic institutions in the
United States. 3 The federal government has long been the primary source of academic
research funding, with the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science
Foundation (NSF), and the Department of Defense (DOD) providing a vast majority
of the funds. 4 Although the government continues to allocate resources for university
research, there are increasing numbers of universities, scientists, and projects seeking

* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I would like to thank the staff of the
Maine Law Review for organizing the Closing in on Open Science: Trends in Intellectual Property and
Scientific Research Symposium, as well as symposium attendees for their helpful comments. I am also
grateful to Michael Mireles for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. Finally, I would like to
thank Abigail Smith (Chicago-Kent '06) and B. Wesley Barger, Jr. (Richmond '07) for providing excellent
research assistance. Comments are welcome at kosenga@richmond.edu
I. Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1915 Declaration of Principles of Academic Freedom and
Academic Tenure, in POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 295 (9th ed. 2001).
2. See Madeyv. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that research universities
engage in research projects that "unmistakably further the institution's legitimate business objectives,
including educating and enlightening students and faculty'' and that these projects "increase the status of
the institution and lure lucrative research grants, students and faculty''). Of course, some argue that the
pursuit of research excellence may have a detrimental effect on the educative arm of the university. See,
e.g., Daniel Alpert & Robert F. Rich, The Information Revolution: implications for Higher Education
Policy, 2001 U. ILL J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 291,296 (2001).
3. National Science Board, Science and Engineering Indicators 2004, at 5-8 (2004), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04/pdf/c05.pdf.
4. Association of University Technology Managers, AUTM U.S. Licensing Survey: FY 2004, at 14
(2005) [hereinafter A UTM Survey] (stating that approximately sixty-seven percent of research expenditures
were paid by federal funds in 2004); National Science Board, supra note 3, at 5-15, 5-17.
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a piece of a finite level of funding, and of course, there is always the concern that
other, non-research priorities may require a change in the government's distribution of
funds. Because of the high, and often fixed, costs of conducting research, funding is
a prerequisite to research. Decreased funding necessarily decreases the amount of
research. The natural extension of this relationship is a reasonably settled principledecreased funding results in decreased innovation.
While certainly less settled, as a matter of principle, the problems related to lack
of access are perceived to cause no less of an obstacle to university research and the
inevitable result of decreased innovation. Many scholars argue that the ability to
engage in scientific research is hampered by the increased presence of patents issued
on scientific building blocks and research tools rendering these resources unavailable
or expensive and making research stemming from their use impossible. 5 Some scholars
claim these patents exacerbate the "tragedy ofthe anticommons. " 6 Other scholars assert
the process that surrounds the acquisition of patents impedes access to the open
dialogue and early accessibility of information that has been a traditional hallmark of
the academy. 7 Yet others, in a criticism tangentially related to access, argue that
university patenting alters the incentives for researchers, who will pursue potentially
lucrative industry-supported research over "curiosity-driven research." 8 This
"curiosity-driven" research is assumed to more likely include foundational or
theoretical research. 9 Finally, the second obstacle, lack of access, may be exacerbated
by the first, lack of funding. Patented inventions, if made available at all, may be
licensed at supra-competitive prices, 10 requiring funding for licensing to be a line-item
cost for a research budget, alongside the costs associated with equipment, materials,
and labor. The argument follows that the access obstacle leads to a decrease in
innovation as surely as does the funding obstacle. Innovation suffers when the
scientists are not able to do research because the required technology is unavailable or
expensive. The scientists are not as productive in their research because they are
unable to build on the promptly-disclosed research of others and they are focused on
commercial inventions that attract corporate funding rather than pure research.

5. E.g., John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products
and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L. J. 101, 177-1 78 (200 1) ("[A]s patents are used to stake
out more territory for future research and development, there may be a decrease in the areas open for
productive research unimpeded by existing patents."); Barry Hoffmaster, Between the Sacred and the
Profane: Bodies, Property, and Patents in the Moore Case, 7 INTELL. PROP. J. 115, 134 (1992) ("The
possibility of obtaining patents has already begun to cast a shroud of secrecy around science and has
decreased the extent to which research materials and results are freely shared among scientists.").
6. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 Sci. 698, 701 (1998). See discussion of the research anticommons, infra, at
notes 32, 37,38 and accompanying text.
7. E.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their
Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REV. 217,219 (2006); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic
Values in Sponsored Research, 66 TEX. L. REv. 1363, 1373-84 (1988); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77,79 (1999).
8. Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven Research and University Technology Transfer, 16
ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECON. GROWTH 97 (2005), available
at http://ssm.cornlabstract=889207.
9. /d.

10. Michael H. Davis, Patent Politics, 56 S.C. L. REv. 337, 341 (2004).

410

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:2

No study has yet definitively tied a decrease in research and innovation to the
availability of patents to and exploitation of patents by universities. Even the first
premise, that university patents cause a decrease in funds available for research and a
decrease in access to essential resources for research, is tenuous at best. 11 I contend
that the answer is not to eliminate university patents or diminish rights available to
universities in their intellectual property, 12 but rather to encourage universities to view
and exploit their intellectual property assets like a savvy business enterprise would.
In fact, the obstacles related to lack of funding and lack of access may actually be
mitigated by university patenting, if universities start obtaining and using their patents
strategically. It should follow that by removing obstacles to university research, the
level of activity and thus innovation should actually increase. While big business did
not initially embrace patenting and, in fact, shared many of the same barriers that
universities express with respect to entering the intellectual property arena, studies
have regularly shown that both patenting by businesses and innovation are rising. 13
To be fair, the business world has not always been so patent savvy; the volume of
intellectual property acquisition and exploitation in the business world today
exponentially eclipses that of the past. Although other reasons may have contributed
to their reluctance to journey into the patent arena, big business certainly experienced
some level of unwillingness or disinterest in jumping full force into patenting, citing
lack of money, lack of knowledge, lack of infrastructure, and concern about upsetting
the research and development culture of the firm. 14 Some companies in the business
world waited until they were on the defensive end of an intellectual property lawsuit
to embrace a patent strategy of their own. 15 Others witnessed intellectual property
being used beneficially (or perhaps witnessed second-hand the liabilities that come
from not having patents) and proactively adopted an intellectual property strategy. 16
Fortunately, in most sectors of business, patents are viewed favorably, and a business
contemplating jumping into the intellectual property arena need not look far for
guidance. For example, in one recent book aimed at the business executive audience,
Kevin Rivette and David Kline, authors of Rembrandts in the Attic, explain the
importance of intellectual property in today's world and impart guidance for
developing an intellectual property strategy to maximize profits and promote
innovation in the firm, basically providing business with a primer of how and why to

II. There are some studies that suggest a relationship between an anticommons effect and university
licensing activity. See Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation System Laboratories: California,
Parents and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1133, 1166-68 (2006).
12. Although the term "intellectual property" encompasses at least patents, trademarks, and copyrights,
I am using this term to specifically connote patents in this Article. The ability of a university to increase
its revenue stream through careful management and exploitation of its trademarks and copyrights, while
interesting, is beyond the scope of this paper.
13. E.g., John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent
System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77,78 (2002) (noting an increase in the amount of patenting and the amount of
innovation).
14. KEVIN G. RNEITE& DAVID KLEIN, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATIIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE
OF PATENTS 37-42 (2000).

15. !d. at 45-46.
16. !d.
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accept intellectual property as the new currency. 17 The experience of big business in
the patent world has been positive-research, innovation, and revenue attributable to
intellectual property are all on the upswing. 18
It would seem that university patenting would produce similar positive results for
research and innovation (and in a domino fashion, perhaps, for revenue) following the
general trend seen by business. While universities are relative newcomers to the patent
world, one benefit is that they do not need to reinvent the wheel. Although there are
certainly issues that are unique to universities, the barriers to entering and participating
in the intellectual property arena are very similar: lack of money, lack of knowledge,
lack of infrastructure, and concern about upsetting the culture of academic research.
In fact, even the concerns that are unique to universities are, at bottom, variations on
the same barriers that businesses face. For example, the wide variety of subject matter
being researched at universities may be unique to academia, but at its essence, the
barrier is in providing an infrastructure equipped to handle such diversity. Similarly,
academic freedom adds a certain twist to the research and development culture, but
there exist similar cultural barriers in industry, as evidenced by the open source
movement. Thus, a university can and should look to and adapt the guidance and
experience of big business to organize and implement an intellectual property
management scheme, hopefully to achieve similar positive results.
In this Article, I argue that patents, if obtained and exploited strategically, can
have a beneficial effect on university research. I will describe the barriers to university
participation in the patent arena-that is, lack of money, lack of knowledge, lack of
infrastructure, and cultural concerns-and explain, with reference to business, how and
why universities need to overcome these barriers. By breaking down these barriers and
ably exploiting their intellectual property, I argue that the obstacles to university
research will be lessened, resulting in increased research and innovation. I further
provide a primer to provide university administrators, technology transfer offices, and
researchers with the information necessary to understand at least the "whys" of
obtaining patents and an initial "how" for exploiting and maximizing the use of these
patents. With reference to the patent management strategies provided by the authors
of Rembrandts in the Attic, I argue that these can be adapted to address the barriers to
the university patenting, as well as show how a coherent patent strategy can set up the
university to overcome the obstacles of lack of access and lack of funding.
In particular, I will address the knowledge barrier faced by universities seeking to
obtain and exploit their intellectual property rights. With this knowledge, the
university can begin to overcome the other barriers, such as lack of money and cultural
concerns. To further this goal, I propose implementing an infrastructure to facilitate
the ability of universities to put into practice the suggestions inspired by Rembrandts
in the Attic, as adapted for universities. This infrastructure includes an entity that will
act as both an aggregator and analyst and will work in conjunction with a modified
version of university technology transfer offices, addressing both the knowledge and
infrastructure barriers. The modifications proposed for technology transfer offices are
directed, in alternate part, towards removing the cultural barrier between researchers

17. See generally, RIVEITE & KLEIN, supra note 14.
18. See id. at 4-13.
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and patenting. The final barrier, lack of money, is intimately tied to the lack of funding
obstacle. In theory, an appropriate patent management strategy will lead to increased
revenue streams and potential lines of funding, which will alleviate both of these
concerns. Finally, the infrastructure suggested includes provisions to address the
access obstacle (and concurrently the cultural barrier), which also should be mitigated
by the impartation of knowledge and the increased potential for funding.
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the problems of university patenting in more
detail. In particular, I review the literature directed to the obstacles related to lack of
funding and lack of access, paying special attention to the role of patenting by the
universities. In Part III, I determine what businesses know that universities do not,
based on the principles and strategies from Rembrandts in the Attic. In Part IV, I adopt
and apply these principles and strategies to the university setting and propose an
infrastructure for implementing these ideas. I explain how this proposal breaks down
the barriers to entering the patent arena, overcomes or at least lessens the obstacles of
lack of access and lack of funding, and ultimately leads to increased research and
innovation. I conclude that universities should adopt a mindset more akin to big
business when considering their intellectual property resources, thereby alleviating the
access and funding obstacles, resulting in greater research and innovation.
II.

UNNERSITY PATENTING--WHAT'S THE PROBLEM?

When considering university patenting, three sequential questions come to mind.
First, can a university own patents? Second, should a university own patents? And
third, what should a university do with its patents? Although the first question has
been answered in the affirmative by Congress in enacting the Bayh-Dole Act, 19 the
remaining two questions remain the topic of extensive debate.
A. Universities as Patent Owners
For much of recent history, and due to the peculiar involvement of the government
in funding most university research, it was unclear whether universities could even own
patents. Although the federal government had been allocating money to scientific
research prior, in the 1940s the government recognized that research conducted by
academic institutions may represent the greatest opportunity for scientific advancement
and, as a result, began to provide funding in the form of grants in 1946. 20 That year,
the Office ofNaval Research and the NIH were created, followed shortly by the NSF,
with the purpose of overseeing the allocation and use of federal funds for scientific
research. 21 Each of these agencies, as well as others instituted later, had different
standards for ownership in inventions created with the provided funds. Worse still,
some patent policy was determined not on an agency level, or even research institution

19. The Universities and Small Business Patent Procedures (Bayh-Do1e) Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517,94
Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2007)) [hereinafter Bayh-Dole Act].
20. Kenneth S. Dueker, Biobusiness on Campus: Commercialization of University-Developed
Biomedical Technologies, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 453, 459-60 (1997).
21. /d. at 460.
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level, but on an ad hoc basis depending on the particular invention in question. 22 The
result was unclear ownership of inventions supported in full or part by government
grant monies. In some cases, where the federal government took title to the invention,
the patents were rarely, if ever, licensed, in part due to the bureaucratic red tape
involved. 23 In fact, studies indicate that only about four percent of patents issued for
inventions funded by NASA, the DOD, and the NIH were ever used. 24 The bottom line
was that the very scientific research the government was trying to promote via federal
funding was instead then simply shelved, unused.
To address this problem, Congress, in 1980, passed the Bayh-Dole Act, having the
stated purpose of promoting the utilization of federally-funded inventions. 25
Specifically, the Act aims:
to promote the utilization of inventions ... ; to encourage maximum participation of
small business firms in federally supported research and development efforts; to
promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations,
including universities; [and] to ensure that inventions made by nonprofit
organizations and small business firms are used in a manner to promote free
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery
26

To accomplish these objectives and prevent inventions based on federally-funded
research from laying fallow and unused, the Act permits the inventing university to
take title in the resulting invention. 27 The relevant requirements of the Act are rather
simple: the university must disclose the invention to the federal government within a
reasonable time; inform the government of its intent to patent the subject invention;
retain title of the invention; share licensing proceeds with the inventors; and use the
remaining licensing income to support further research or education. 28 With the patent
in the hands of the university, it is hoped the invention will be used and licensed, more
so than it would have been if the government had title. 29 To protect the government's
interest, the Act also contains a provision granting a paid-up license to the federal
government, such that neither the federal government nor its contractors can be liable
for infringing an invention created using federal research funds. 30

22. Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 399 (2006).
23. Dueker, supra note 20, at 460.
24. Pulsinelli, supra note 22, at 397. This low number, however, may be the result of selection bias
in the government-sponsored patents surveyed. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1679-80 ( 1996).
25. 35 u.s.c. § 200 (2007).
26. !d.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 202(a).
28. !d. § 202(c).
29. Other articles have investigated the efficacy of the Bayh-Dole Act in reaching its objectives. See,
e.g., Pulsinelli, supra note 22; Eisenberg, supra note 24. However, this topic is beyond the scope of this
article.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4).
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B. Criticisms of Bayh-Dole and the Problems of University Ownership
The Act answers the question "Can a university own patents?" However, going
forward, the question remains "Should a university own patents?" The answer to this
question should also be an unqualified "Yes." As previously noted, some
commentators claim that university patenting creates, at least in part, the obstacles of
funding and access that hamper academic research. 31 Professor Mark Lemley explains,
"While in theory patents spur innovation, they can also interfere with it. Broad patents
granted to initial inventors can lock up or retard improvements needed to take a new
field from interesting lab results to commercial viability." 32 Many of these initial,
broad inventions are believed to result from the type of basic science and foundational
research performed in the academy. Opponents of university patenting argue thus that
research and innovation is hampered because patents can be used as blocking
mechanisms, patents can create an anti commons effect, and patents can cause a chilling
of the disclosure that is a tradition of the academy, all of which are perceived to inhibit
access to research and increase the amount of funding required to do research.
Patents, unlike most other forms of property rights, do not grant the holder any
affirmative rights; rather, a patent simply permits the owner to exclude others from
making, using, selling, or offering for sale the patented invention. 33 Because a patentee
cannot technically grant a license to practice the invention, a patent license instead
provides a promise from the patentee not to sue the licensee upon using the invention. 34
This unusual bundle of rights granted by a patent can give rise to a situation where a
later invention, which is patentable, cannot be practiced due to another, earlier issued
patent. 35 The earlier patent is a "blocking" patent, and its holder basically has
exclusionary rights over not just the invention described in that patent, but also any
other patent that requires that invention to be practiced. 36
For a very simplistic example, consider inventor A, who obtains a patent on a
bucket. Inventor B invents a bucket with a handle. B 's invention is (for the purposes
of this example, at least) patentable, because it is a new and non-obvious improvement
on the prior art. However, to use B's invention, A's bucket is required; the patent on
A is a blocking patent. B could choose to license the use of A's invention, or as is
common in these situations, A and B could cross-license their patents to each other.
However, A could potentially thwart B by refusing to license or cross-license its bucket
patent. If there are other bucket patents out there, B might be able to negotiate with
those patent owners, but if A's invention is, instead of a bucket, an essential research
input or research tool for which there are no substitutes, this may not be an option.

31. One additional criticism is the idea of"double paying." This complaint asserts that the public has
funded the research through payment of taxes, but then also has to pay for the research again in the form
of supra-competitive prices on the patented products that result. See Eisenberg, supra note 24. Regardless
of the validity of this argument and its relevance generally to university patenting schemes, it is not related
to the obstacles of access and funding, and thus is outside the scope of this paper.
32. Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REv. 609,618-19 (2005).
33. Pulsinelli, supra note 22, at 412-13.
34. !d. at 413.
35. !d. at 414.
36. !d.
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It is this ability to potentially block future innovation that fuels the first concern
about university patenting. The foundational research performed by universities means
that many inventions discovered may be necessary inputs or tools for further research.
Before the Bayh-Dole Act, these inventions either became part of the public domain
or were the property of the unlikely-to-litigate United States government, so the patents
on these inventions did not pose a threat to future research. However, now that these
patents on building block technologies are instead being held by private partiesuniversities, research institutions, and an increasing number of companiescommentators fear that one party may be able to block any or all future endeavors in
a particular area of research through failure or refusal to license its patents.
A related criticism is the idea that these patent rights will lead to a tragedy ofthe
anticomrnons. Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg define the problem
this way:
[A] resource is prone to underuse in a "tragedy ofthe anticommons" when multiple
owners each have a right to exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an
effective privilege of use. In theory, in a world of costless transactions, people could
always avoid commons or anticommons tragedies by trading their rights. In practice,
however, avoiding tragedy requires overcoming transaction costs, strategic behaviors,
and cognitive biases of participants, with success more likely within close-knit
communities than among hostile strangers. Once an anticommons emerges, collecting
rights into usable private property is often brutal and slow. 37

Proponents of the "tragedy of the anticomrnons" theory note that, although patents
have been traditionally granted for downstream products, there is an increasing
tendency for researchers, particularly in the biomedical area, to patent upstream
inventions, such as research tools and inputs to basic research. 38 The argument is that
patenting upstream technology will cause patent thickets that hinder future development and research. 39 In particular, Heller and Eisenberg point to license stacking as
leading to these problems because permission to use multiple upstream products and
inputs will be necessary to conduct research. 40
For a simple hypothetical, consider a complicated research process that requires,
among other things, two patented inputs and includes at least one patented step. Each
of these three patents is owned by a separate party, and no single party has sufficient
rights to perform the research process. The research process itself is not patented, and
yet, to perform the process, a scientist will need to negotiate licenses with three parties,
each with its own interests in mind. Although the inputs may only represent a small
portion of the research process, the patentees of the inputs may require an industry-

37. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 698.
38. Christopher M. Holman, Biotechnology's Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REv.
INTELL. PROP. L. 318,330 (2006).
39. /d.
40. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 672. By way of example, many researchers conduct research
leading to patents on segments of a gene sequence, which may prevent another researcher from collecting
the pieces necessary to invent a screening method that needs to access multiple segments. See id. Stacking
also creates issues with respect to funding because even if the above researcher can obtain licenses to access
each of the necessary gene segments, the aggregation oflicensing fees may make the project financially
untenable. See id.
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standard royalty which is greater than the value of the input to the process. 41 Thus,
research becomes costly, both in terms of license fees that must be paid (and which
may not reflect the value of the patented invention to the process) as well as the
indirect costs of having to find and negotiate with multiple patent holders.
Two additional criticisms, though less direct, blame patents for decreased
research. First, at least one commentator contends that the process requirements of
university patenting stifle the early disclosure and dialogue that have long been part of
the university culture. 42 Presentations and publications were previously the measure
of productivity and prestige for academics. 43 However, because disclosure of an
invention via presentation or publication can destroy the novelty required to obtain a
patent, university scientists are now being counseled to keep their research private until
a patent application can be prepared. 44 Because new inventions are not disclosed
quickly, follow-on research is purportedly hindered.
Second, some commentators assert that university patenting commercializes
academia. 45 That is, professors are not conducting research for the sake of intellectual
inquiry, but rather choose their projects based on commercial potential or investor
guidance. 46 In addition to altering research paths away from basic science and towards
applied science and commercial innovation, critics also contend that the increasing
commercialization of university research labs is harming the university's attention to
its other goal-education. "[M]odem [science and engineering] departments function
more like miniature research corporations that happen to do some undergraduate
teaching on the side."47 Because it is assumed that only universities will perform
foundational research, critics argue that the fact scientists are steering away from this
type of research will cause a dearth of innovation in basic research. 48
Without question, the bulk ofthe scholarship promotes the above argument that
university patenting leads to lack of access, which in tum leads to decreased research
and innovation. However, there is some limited support in the literature for university
patenting. 49 Professor F. Scott Kiefftakes on the anti-patent literature directly, arguing
that "patents are essential" for the advancement of research and innovation. 5° KiefT
contends, contrary to much of the literature, that patents may not be to blame for lack

41. For a thorough and detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl
Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 324
(2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=923468 (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
42. Bagley, supra note 7, at 220-21.
43. !d. at 239-40.
44. !d. at 242-44.
45. Strandburg, supra note 8.
46. See id.
47. Sarah J. Bannister, Note, Low Wages, Long Hours, Bad Working Conditions: Science and

Engineering Graduate Students Should Be Considered Employees Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 135 (2005) (citing JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNNERSITY, INC.: THE
CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 73-1 02 (2005); Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Corporatization
ofthe University: Distance Learning at the Cost ofAcademic Freedom?, 12 B.U. PUB.lNT. L.J. 73,100-13
(2002)).
48. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 8.
49. F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science-a Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 691 (2001).
50. /d. at 692.
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of access because scientists have generally regarded their work as some form of
intellectual property anyway and "have demonstrated countless ingenious methods for
staking out, defending, and even pirating this form of intellectual property." 51 KiefT
goes on to note that, rather than blocking access, the exclusionary power granted by
the patent is "paradoxically essential" to promoting utilization of the technology. 52 In
addition to improving utilization, KiefT also argues that patent protection may also
encourage research by providing a less-established scientist with necessary funding,
whereas funds may otherwise only be available to more-established scientists. 53
Finally, KiefT argues that basic research, "like any process, can be viewed as one that
requires inputs and generates outputs, and experience shows that patents on inputs
generally do not prevent the production of outputs." 54
Although the literature in support of university patenting may be scarce, there are
other indicators that this endeavor produces apparently positive results. For example,
other industrial nations have begun implementing national legislation similar to the
Bayh-Dole Act. 55 For example, in 1998 Japan enacted a national "Industrial
Revitalization Law" to allow university recipients of government funds to own the
resulting intellectual property. 56 The Japanese law includes a provision for compulsory
licensing if the universities are not working the invention and requires Japanese
universities to license intellectual property rights free of charge "if the government
believes it is in the public interest to do so." 57 Similarly, Australia has a Bayh-Dole
model of ownership for inventions resulting from government funding. 58 Some
European countries have enacted legislation emulating many of the Bayh-Dole
hallmarks. 59 Despite evidence of little success for these foreign technology transfer
provisions, 60 the significance is in these countries' belief that the provisions work in
the United States and the appropriation of the idea for their own laws.

51. !d. at 694 (citing RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 365 (1955)).
52. !d. at 699.
53. !d. at 703.
54. !d. at 703-04 (citing Ellen Schrecker, Academic Freedom: The Historical View, in REGULATING
THE INTELLECTUALS: PERSPECTIVES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOMS IN THE 1980s I (Craig Kaplan & Ellen
Schrecker eds., 1983)).
55. DAVID C. MOWERY ET AL., IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED STATES 95 (Martin
Kenney & Bruce Kogut, eds., 2004) (citing a recent report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) showing "a general trend across OECD countries to emulate the Bayh-Dole
patent legislation .... ").
56. See, e.g., Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price ofProgress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?,
44 Hous. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfrn?abstract_id=917367 (all page references for this article refer to the version at this web address); The
Brains Business, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/displaystory.
cfm?story_id=4339960.
57. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 68 (citation omitted).
58. !d. at 69.
59. !d. Despite any cultural differences, I contend that European technology transfer offices would
likely experience more positive results if they expended effort to craft and execute a strategic patent
management strategy.
60. !d.
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Neither KiefT nor the many critics of university patenting offer anything more than
theoretical support for their respective positions. However, there is some reason to
believe that the parade ofhorribles attributed to university patenting is unwarranted.
In fact, a survey of current research, albeit preliminary, provides at least mixed support
for the necessity of university patenting. 61 Similar studies have been done to assess the
effect of patenting on innovation outside of academia, but no study convincingly ties
the presence of patenting to a decrease in research and innovation. To the contrary,
studies have shown that the increased number of patents have in fact led to increased
innovation. "[E]ven when employed for competitive purposes, patents appear to have
also had the effect (perhaps ironically) of fostering innovation in new areas of
research."62 Similarly, a study undertaken to determine whether the increase in patents
was a result of patent-friendly courts or an actual increase in innovation came out
decidedly in favor ofinnovation. 63 Other scholars have tied the patent policy reforms
of the 1980s, which made obtaining and enforcing patents easier, to a positive effect
on technology commercialization. 64 Business is embracing patents and the result seems
to be increased innovation. Given that patenting has been part of the academic
landscape for some twenty-five years and part of the business landscape for much
longer, and given that there has been no discernible slowdown in research and
innovation in this country, it is a fair assumption that the effects of patenting at the
university level are, if not beneficial, at least neutral.
Thus, I argue that universities should own patents, leaving only the question of
"What should a university do with its patents?" How this question is answered is the
key to both allaying the above criticisms of university patenting, as well as, I believe,
overcoming the prevailing obstacles to university research-funding and access.
Unfortunately, this is a difficult question to address and among the barriers universities
face as they enter the intellectual property arena. While the question of how a
university should use its patents is likely a multi-level determination, the body that is
likely to figure prominently in at least the implementation, if not the decision-making
process, is the technology transfer office.

C. University Technology Transfer Offices
Not unlike the increase in popularity of patent attorneys and intellectual property
counsel tied to the increased interest in intellectual property in the business world, the
technology transfer office ofthe university has seen its popularity rise from overlooked
(or even non-existent) to somewhat of a "big man on campus." Although the point for
which Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss makes the following observation is negative, there
is no denying the truth of the substance of the remark: "Universities have also begun
to regard their technology transfer offices as the academic equivalent of their football
teams: even if the offices aren't winning, there is cachet in fielding them. And the
technology transfer offices want to win, just like the football teams do."65
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62.
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RNETTE & KLEIN, supra note 14, at 45.
Id. at 49.
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Unfortunately, most technology transfer offices are not equipped or designed to win,
in no small part because the characteristics of a well-functioning technology transfer
office have not been well defined. Further, many universities have not considered how
to fully integrate the technology transfer office with the university and the business
world outside to achieve maximum benefit from the university's inventions and the
protection efforts made by the technology transfer office. Any discussion of improving
the intellectual property management strategy of a university must begin with the
technology transfer office.
One of the first requirements for a university to enter the patent arena is to
establish a technology transfer office, an activity that has been on the increase. In
1980, prior to the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, there were only twenty-five
technology transfer offices active at United States universities. 66 By 2005, that number
had jumped to some 3,300 technology transfer offices active at universities, research
institutions, and hospitals around the country. 67 Over a similar time span, 1988-2003,
patents assigned to universities rose from 800 patents to 3,200. 68 The amount of
money spent by universities on patent-acquisition increased from thirty-seven million
dollars in 1991 to 221 million dollars in 2004. 69 It is clear that it is not simply the
researchers on campus that have been busy and productive-the technology transfer
offices have been hard at work as well.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office, in conjunction with the NSF,
prepared a report summarizing patents obtained by universities from 1969 to 2003, as
well as information about research expenditures in 2002. 70 In 2003, 3,259 utility
patents were assigned to universities or colleges, out of a total of 169,024 utility
patents granted overall. 71 In that year, the leading universities, based on patents
obtained, were the University of California (439 patents), the California Institute of
Technology (139), Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology ( 127), and the University of
Texas (96). 72 Not surprisingly, each of these universities has an active and visible
technology transfer office presence. 73
The second requirement is that the technology transfer office be arranged and
equipped to adequately handle the necessary tasks to acquire and exploit intellectual
property. This metric is a bit harder to measure, since there are numerous ways to

Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 457,464 (2004).
66. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 43.
67. Karen Pollarito, When Science Has a Potential Payoff, THE SCIENTIST, Jan. 17, 2005, available
at http://www.the-scientist.com/article/display/15195.
68. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2006,
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c5/c5h.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
69. AUTMsurvey, supra note 4, at 20.
70. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES-UTILITY PATENT
GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969-2003, http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/univ/univ_toc.htm (last visited Feb.
16, 2007).
71. /d.
72. /d.
73. See University of California Technology Transfer System, http://www.ucop.edu/ottl; Cal tech Office
of Technology Transfer, http://www.ott.caltech.edu; MIT's Technology Licensing Office,
http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/aboutlour_mission.html; University of Texas System Intellectual Property,
http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectualproperty/index.htm.
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establish a technology transfer office. For example, the technology transfer office of
each of the institutions listed in the previous paragraph is arranged and equipped
uniquely. 74 Typically, in the university setting, technology transfer offices will fall into
four general modes: (i) a "centralized" model, where a single office provides patent
acquisition services for all research and technology areas for the who~e university; (ii)
a "decentralized" model, where the separate divisions ofthe technology transfer office
are associated with different research and technology areas (for example, there may be
one office or unit for the physics department, another for the engineering school, and
so on); (iii) the "foundation" model, where an independent nonprofit organization is
created expressly to manage intellectual property acquisition and/or licensing; and (iv)
the "contractor" model, where a university outsources its acquisition and licensing
activities to another entity, such as a law firm. 75 A technology transfer office may also
utilize two or more of these modes in combination.
At the least-involved end of the spectrum, the technology transfer office serves
merely as a conduit between the researcher and an outside entity charged with
obtaining and exploiting intellectual property on behalfof the university (following the
contractor model). 76 For example, the technology transfer office may gather invention
disclosures from scientists on campus and forward them to an outside law firm hired
by the university. At the other end of the spectrum, the technology transfer office may
also pursue acquisition and exploitation of inventions from within; this could be done
either on a centralized or decentralized basis. 77 For example, a well-staffed technology
transfer office may be able to gather invention disclosures, apply for and prosecute
patents, and actively seek to license or otherwise exploit the resulting intellectual
property assets. Most technology transfer offices will fall somewhere in between the
two extremes.
In addition to acquiring and exploiting intellectual property in a traditional
manner, universities have also begun to address the research-funding question
creatively by implementing industrial affiliate programs. 78 In these affiliations, for
example, an industry partner will pay an annual fee in the ten thousand to fifty
thousand dollar range in exchange for having first rights in the intellectual property
generated in a certain sector or sectors of the university's research developments.
Harvard, a leader in this type of partnership arrangement, announced in November
2005 its intent to seek more commercial partnerships for research and licensing, and
plans to spend ten million dollars on an "accelerator fund" to bridge the gap between
early stage research funded by private agencies and advanced research paid for by

74. For example, the Intellectual Property division of the General Counsel's office for the University
of Texas system staff includes two attorneys, one legal assistant, and one support person. See
http://www.utsystem.edu/OGC/intellectuaiProperty/index.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). In contrast,
MIT's website boasts twenty-nine employees, including four technology licensing officers/directors (one
designated an attorney), five additional technology licensing officers, four associate technology licensing
officers, two technology licensing associates (one designated an attorney), four financial operations staff,
four office operations staff, two persons for patent administration, two legal assistants and two
administrative assistants. See http://web.mit.edu/tlo/www/about/our_staff.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
75. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 44.
76. /d.
77. /d.
78. /d. at 45.
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venture capitalists. 79 Technology transfer offices stand to play an integral liaison role
in these relationships as well.
Unfortunately, the reality is that technology transfer offices are often not arranged
or equipped to fulfill these varying roles in the patent acquisition and exploitation
arenas. From the exponential increase in amount of university inventions being
considered for patenting, to the wide array of potential subject areas of invention at
large universities, to the difficulty in determining industry partners or potential
licensees without being part ofthe industry, to convincing administrators and scientists
that the academic culture now includes patents and that priorities and resources should
be allocated appropriately, the technology transfer offices of today and the future have
many difficult tasks. These tasks are made more difficult by the fact that most
universities do not yet view themselves as commercial players in the intellectual
property arena, and even some ofthe more forward-thinking institutions are not sure
how to do it well. Universities, and in particular the technology transfer offices, need
to look no further than the business world to gain all of the information and insight
needed to play the game well.
III. WHAT Do BUSINESSES KNOW THAT UNIVERSITIES DON'T?

Businesses did not spring into the intellectual property arena fully formed and
ready to acquire and exploit patent assets. Rather, the adoption and implementation
of patent management strategies required a number of small steps, forward and
backward, before becoming generally accepted and adopted by most firms. Although
slow to embrace at first, businesses now fully accept that "(t]he old industrial era has
been supplanted by a new knowledge-based economy in which ideas and innovation
rather than land or natural resources have become the principal wellsprings of
economic growth and competitive business advantage." 80 The simplest expression of
this notion is quite clear: "[I]deas really are where the money is. " 81 This is the first
point that universities need to embrace in order to learn from the experience of
business in intellectual property. Oddly, universities, which have always been in the
business of ideas and innovation, seem more hesitant to adopt these maxims than did
the business world.
Businesses exhibit a number of different motivations driving the adoption of
intellectual property management schemes, motivations that may not have influenced
the academy-yet. Overcoming the initial reluctance to engage in patent acquisition
and exploitation was not always easy; some companies, including Microsoft and Dell,
did not become patent owners until they found themselves on the defensive ends of
patent litigation suits. 82 Other companies entered the patent game after witnessing the
success (and their relative Jack in comparison) of their competitors who had embraced
intellectual property. 83 Regardless of what spurred their entry into the patent arena,
more and more companies are becoming more and more active in their acquisition of

79. Stephen Heuser, Harvard Woos Firms to Fund Research, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 9, 2005 at I.
80. RIVETTE & KLEIN, supra note 14, at 1-2.
81. /d. at 50.
82. Id. at 45-46.
83. /d.
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intellectual property. For example, some large companies, such as Sun and Oracle,
have boosted the size of their patent portfolios by more than 500 percent in just a few
years. 84
In addition to exhibiting a growing interest in obtaining patents, businesses are
making increased efforts to exploit their acquired intellectual property assets. Patent
licensing revenues rose some 700 percent, from $15 billion in 1990 to $100 billion in
1998. 85 These revenues can be used in a number of ways: to boost company earnings
and shareholder returns, to improve the return on research and development
investments, or to seed additional research and innovation. Beyond simple revenue
generation, firms may also utilize their intellectual property assets to generate nonmonetary benefits. For example, value associated with patents can be used to raise
corporate valuations, enhance equity, and serve as a type of currency for mergers and
acquisitions. 86 Patents may further be used as an offensive business tool, encouraging
competitors to not engage in certain behaviors, or as a defensive business tool,
providing the business with an asset to offer for cross-license if accused of violating
another's intellectual property rights. Finally, patents often serve a signaling function,
supplying information about the technological and legal competence of a business. 87
Depending on the technology involved, innovation level, and breadth of the patent, a
business can use a patent for any, or all, of these purposes, all of which provide visible
benefits to the business.
On the flipside, a mismanaged patent portfolio can produce devastating results for
the company. Failure to have a coherent patent management strategy can lead to
breakdowns in both the acquisition and exploitation of a business's intellectual
property assets. These breakdowns can include: failure to obtain critical patents or
patents that may lead to lucrative situations; failure to identify potential relationships
with partners and licensees; failure to realize the defensive value of a patent portfolio
when challenged by another company on intellectual property issues; and failure to
follow through on patent-related aspects of business, such as product development,
branding, and market expenditures. 88 Although businesses seem to have embraced
intellectual property, there are, of course, still problems. In contrast to universities,
where the primary problem appears to be the lack of an intellectual property
management strategy, or worse, the failure to acknowledge the importance of pursuing
intellectual property assets, businesses more often stumble in their execution of
already-established strategic plans. In a 1998 survey of companies, 90 percent of
companies agreed that patents can be important, but 71 percent admitted to wasting
research and development resources through patent mismanagement. 89 Similarly, while
84 percent of these companies have a patent policy in place, only 42 percent conduct
regular IP audits to ensure that their patent policy is achieving its goals. 90
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To play successfully in the intellectual property arena, the first step for any
business is to develop a coherent patent strategy. For most businesses, this strategy
will be aimed at three primary objectives: 1) strengthening its proprietary market
advantages, 2) improving financial performance, and 3) enhancing competitiveness. 91
To strengthen its proprietary market advantages, a business will want to maintain the
technology edge of its products or services, focus on boosting the outputs of its
research and development efforts, exercise effective branding of its products, and
anticipate and move early with respect to market and technology shifts. 92 Improving
financial performance will require the business to audit and examine its patent assets
for new revenue sources, reduce its costs, and bolster its corporate financing and
valuation efforts. 93 Finally, to enhance competitiveness, the business will want to
analyze and outflank its competitors, identify and exploit new market opportunities,
and reduce competitive risks. 94
These goals should not be surprising--every firm wants to make more money and
outdo its competitors. Rembrandts asserts successful achievement of these goals can
be obtained through the intelligent use of patent assets. 95 In particular, the book
provides an assessment system to be applied to a business's intellectual property-the
"Grow-Fix-Sell" triage to assist with patent exploitation. 96 A business cannot exploit
its intellectual property until it knows what assets it holds and where those assets can
be used. 97 To make these assessments, the business must first audit its intellectual
property assets, assign the patents to a responsible business unit, and create a grid map
in which business units are grouped with respect to growth and potential. 98 Once the
intellectual property assets are identified and assigned to a responsible unit, each asset
is analyzed to determine if it should be grown, fixed or sold. 99 An asset that should be
grown is one that has potential to develop into new product lines or expand into new
markets. 100 An asset slated for fixing may be in an area of slow growth or cluttered or
eroding markets; the business may need to assess whether there are ways the asset can
still be used beneficially. 101 Finally, an asset that cannot be used for growing or fixing
should be sold to get the most economic or strategic value from the asset that offers no
additional value to the business. 102
In addition to assessing the business's existing assets for potential exploitation, the
business must have a strategy for patent acquisition. When determining what technologies to pursue patent protection for, a firm must identify the business's core technology advantage and seek patents to reinforce the product's differentiating features and
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control the choke points in the manufacturing and distributing lines. 103 This may
involve patenting key methods for building, marketing, and selling the product, beyond
seeking protection for the product itself. 104 In identifying what to protect, the business
should conduct a preliminary assessment to identify exactly what its core technology
advantage is, that is, the business must identify the nature of its product or products
and how it fits within the business's strategic goals. 105 Next, the business must
determine the feasibility ofexploiting the technology, which may require analyzing the
costs involved, the technology required to manufacture and distribute, and the time it
will take to get a viable product to market. 106 With these steps in place, the business
should be able to appropriately identify technology for patenting, as well as have a
strategy for managing the patents it has obtained.
However, simply designing a patent management strategy is not sufficient-the
business needs to implement and execute the strategy as well. 107 As noted above, it is
more often at this step that businesses fail. 108 The first issue with respect to execution
is to ensure that management is structured to reflect the importance of intellectual
property. 109 This will often require a change in leadership structure; at a minimum the
intellectual property decision-making cannot be the sole province of the in-house
patent counsel. 110 Instead, Rembrandts recommends a multi-level structure to
implement the intellectual property strategy, ranging from business units to high-level
executives. 111 The business units, with front-line experience, are responsible for
reporting patent creation and usage. 112 However, the responsibility for overseeing the
execution of the intellectual property strategy must rise above the business units and
be centralized to the business. 113 Finally, ultimate leadership decisions must be made
at an upper level, such as senior vice president. 114 Part of the purpose for this
delegation of duties is to allocate responsibility to the parties best able to accomplish
the task. 115 In other words, the business units will be most knowledgeable about the
product's core and differentiating features as well as the choke points for
manufacturing and distribution. 116 Alternatively, a higher-level officer will understand
a product's fit within the entire business line and will also have the power to implement
the decisions. 117
This interplay between the various levels in the patent management structure
would be incomplete without mention of the inventors. In fact, the perceived divide
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between the research side and the management side of business is perhaps one ofthe
reasons for the hesitancy of business to adopt intellectual property as a commodity.
As authors Julie L. Davis and Suzanne S. Harrison note:
In many companies, the research and development or 'R&D' function, has been
literally a 'black box.' Inventors-whether engineers, scientists, or web designershave received special treatment--often keeping odd hours and receiving incentives
for their ideas .... It has been up to the business folks on the other side of the
wall--or even in a different building altogether-to shape and refine that idea into a
saleable product or service that can generate revenue. 118

Any effective patent management strategy will need to bridge this gap between science
and business.
Businesses are embracing these strategies and techniques, and they are benefiting
from the strategic acquisition and exploitation of their intellectual property. A number
of simple, but important thoughts should be clear from this brief synopsis of
Rembrandts. First, patents are critical. Second, patents need to be acquired on a
relatively generous, although strategic, basis. That is, a business should acquire patents
on more than just its invented technology, but also the technology associated with the
manufacturing and distribution and any other choke point in the process. Third,
patents can be used by businesses in a variety of different manners; the business needs
to consider ways to use their patents creatively. Fourth, businesses that acquire patents
cannot just rest on their laurels, but instead need to regularly and actively review their
patent portfolios looking for opportunities to grow, fix, or sell. Fifth, the structure of
the parties responsible for executing the business's intellectual property management
strategy is important to ensure success.
Although universities suffer from some unique problems in that they are not
simply businesses, these essential points can be applied and adapted to not just address
the peculiarities of academia, but also to overcome the barriers that universities
typically cite as reasons against implementing patent management strategies and to
alleviate the obstacles that hamper university research.
IV. How CAN UNIVERSITIES BE MORE LIKE BUSINESSES?
Universities, like businesses, are experiencing a period where intellectual property
is becoming an increasingly critical commodity. It is not only in the business world
that intellectual property assets are the new cash, and similar to businesses, the indirect
benefits for a university of acquiring and exploiting intellectual property assets are
many. The problem is that universities most often do not view their intellectual
property management activities as an integral part of their "business." They have not
set up a coherent patent management strategy. They may not have even set up a
technology transfer office, although this is becoming rarer. However, of the
universities that have set up technology transfer offices, most were not created with the
execution of a patent management strategy in mind. In this section, I will review the
problems with universities in moving in this direction, as well as analyze a proposal

118. JULIEL. DAVIS & SUZANNE S. HARRISON, EDISON IN THE BOARDROOM: HOW LEADING COMPANIES
REALIZE VALUE FROM THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS I (200 I).
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that has been raised to address some of the problems. I then provide the university
with a primer for creating an intellectual property management strategy and a proposed
structure to help it effectively implement the designed strategy.
A. The Problems with Universities

In order to function like a business, the university will need to have an overall
intellectual property management strategy, at least a basic understanding of the bows
and whys of exploiting its intellectual property, and the infrastructure to implement
these plans. Unfortunately, universities are lacking to some extent each of these three
facets.
One problem with establishing a patent management strategy at the university level
may be the academy's historical aversion or disinterest in the patent system. However,
even if a university surmounts this hurdle and enters the patent arena, it likely faces one
or more of the following, additional difficulties. First, the breadth of research at
universities prohibits the ability to base a strategic plan along a set of product lines.
For example, in the business arena, a car manufacturer will be seeking patents on
automobile technology, plus the manufacturing and distribution technologies to bring
the automobile technology to the public. Even research that results in technology
outside of conventional automobile technology is likely to be driven by or relate to the
core research; one such technology might be a database designed as a knowledgemanagement system for tracking best-practices on the assembly line. While a
knowledge-management database is not likely to be considered conventional
automobile technology, it was driven by the underlying goal of developing automobile
technology. A strategic plan can be built around these technologies, because they
derive from foreseeable sources.
A university, on the other hand, has research occurring in multiple areas, on
multiple levels, which may be wholly unrelated to other research in other areas. The
biomedical engineering department may be inventing new materials for creating
implants that generate fewer rejection reactions from a patient's body, while the
medical school may be inventing new surgical procedures and the tools to perform
them, and the physics department may be developing new methods and apparatuses for
smashing atoms to generate energy. The inventions and directions of research are not
coherent, and (again, largely unlike businesses) the directions may change from year
to year. This breadth of invention may create a great difficulty for a patent
management team to decide where to focus limited energies and efforts-it is hard to
create a strategy for patent acquisition when it is unknown from where the next
invention may be corning.
Second, universities, who are hampered perhaps by their late entry into this arena,
are unaware ofthe bows and whys of exploiting their patents. Many institutions now
understand that at least one common exploitation technique is licensing, but the
mechanics of doing so escape them. Intellectual property licensing in academia has
been skyrocketing; one study estimates licensing at some $611 million in 1997 (an 89
percent increase over 1993). 119 Despite these encouraging statistics, it is fair to say that
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universities are not making their best efforts at licensing their assets. In general,
universities are passive in their licensing attempts, limiting their efforts to cold calling,
listing available technology on the Internet, or attempting to foster industry contacts
by hiring technology transfer office staffhaving business backgrounds. 12° Cold calling
and technology listings are not generally successful modalities because there are
information deficiencies-technology transfer offices may not know who to pursue as
potential licensees and companies seeking licenses may not think of universities as the
place to look to license technology. Moreover, as noted previously, the breadth of
inventions and research areas at the university make it nearly impossible for the
technology transfer office to be knowledgeable in each, a prerequisite to understanding
the pool of potential licensees. Further, university technology transfer offices have
been accused of over-charging potential licensees to the point of deterring deals,
perhaps because of a lack of understanding of the market in which the licensing occurs
or the strategic plan of the university with respect to this technology. 121 On the flipside, university technology transfer offices have also been charged with pipelining
exclusive deals to favored licensees, such as faculty start-up businesses, for little or no
consideration, agreements that entice faculty members to work and remain at the
institution, but may not be the most lucrative use of the asset. 122
Another issue hampering licensing by the university is its desire to "have its cake
and eat it too." That is, institutions are writing into their license agreements terms
which they would object to ifthey were on the other end of the deal. 123 One National
Institute of Health study
concluded that "universities have sought just about every kind of clause in research
tool licenses to which they themselves have objected, including publication
restrictions, rights in or the option to license future discoveries, and prohibition on
transfer to other institutions or scientists." This phenomenon has been characterized
as the "Paradox of the Patent Community" whereby universities, as major-technology
users, appear to have an interest in broad-use rights, but as major patent-owners they
fight instead for stronger patent protections. 124
One final impediment to university exploitation of their patent assets are the
reports that very few universities are profiting from their technology transfer
enterprises. 125 Patent royalties appear insignificant when compared to total university
revenue, constituting somewhere between 0.5 and 2 percent of revenue at the high
end. 126 Not surprisingly, the biggest success stories seem to be in the pharmaceutical
world, where the risks and payouts are the biggest for all players. One such example

120. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 45.
121. /d. at 48 (citing Pollarito, supra note 67, at 6).
122. /d.
123. /d. at 52.
124. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 52 (quoting NIH Report on Working Group on Research Tools
(1998), available at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools).
125. Heuser, supra note 79, at 2.
126. Amy Kapczynski eta!., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for
University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. I 031, I 088 (2005) (citing Yochai Benkler, CommonsBased Strategies and the Problems ofPatents, 305 SCIENCE Ill 0 (2004)).
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is the patented HIV drug Emtriva, developed in part by Emory University. 127 Another
is the Cohen-Boyer patent on recombinant DNA technology licensed successfully by
Stanford University. 128
However, putting aside the superstars of university licensing, the low revenue
percentage associated with licensing may be quite misleading-revenue for universities
comes from a number of different sources, from tuition to gifts to athletic ticket sales
to licensing of branded products. It is not surprising, given the nature of the patents
as well as the ineptitude that many technology transfer offices exhibit with respect to
licensing, that the licensing income stream is not substantial. Furthermore, universities
are not viewing these figures with the proper attitude; these figures represent nearly
pure profit. The research has been done and was going to be done anyway, and the
costs of obtaining intellectual property protection are a minor expenditure compared
to the costs of research. Thus, if the technology can be licensed at all, it should
represent a win-win situation for the university.
Therefore, an important part of the university's patent management strategy must
include a more robust and active approach to licensing, as well as making efforts to use
intellectual property assets in alternative ways. To do this, the intellectual property
management team must be aware of potential licensees, understand current business
and technology trends, and recognize, to the extent possible, how the current university
research fits into the big picture. This leads to the third problem, which is that a
university often lacks adequate infrastructure to exploit its intellectual property assets
in the same way a business does. Technology transfer offices, the department typically
held at least partially responsible for acquiring and exploiting patents, vary greatly in
their staffing. Some universities staff their technology transfer offices with attorneys,
others with business majors or administrators. Regardless of whether the office is
staffed with lawyers or business people, given the breadth of inventions coming out of
the university's research labs, it is unlikely that the staff will be sufficiently
knowledgeable about the best avenues for licensing in many cases. Further, the
technology transfer office is not often a high-level department in the university, so
decision-making will often need to go above. Without a strategic plan, the knowledge
to exploit the assets, and the infrastructure to do so, it is unlikely that the assets
acquired by the university are going to reach their full potential and are much more
likely to cause the problems attributed to them, as discussed previously.
This observation that universities are not effectively utilizing their intellectual
property is not new. Professor Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, for one, has noted this
problem (and other problems that plague university patenting) and proposes a unified
national techno logy transfer center to make identifYing potential licensing relationships
more convenient. 129 This center would be organized by technology departments, using
the Patent Office technology center taxonomy for example. 130 The center would

127. Bagley, supra note 7, at n.47.
128. Ted Sabety, Nanotechnology Innovation and the Patent Thicket: Which IP Policies Promote
Growth?, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 477,485 (2005).
129. Ritchie de Larena, supra note 56, at 74. Ritchie de Larena also views underreporting of patented
inventions prepared with federal funding to be a significant problem, to which her proposal is also
addressed.
130. !d. at 74.
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provide a primary, centralized repository of university patents for businesses seeking
to license technology. 131 Income received from the licensing would be split; the
revenue from the license to a commercial licensee would be used first to pay for the
costs associated with patenting the technology. 132 Second, a small fee may be charged
to cover the operating costs of the center. 133 Of the remaining revenue, the inventors
would share a substantial portion. 134 Some small percentage would go to the institution
to which the inventor belongs and a nominal amount would go to the university to
cover the technology transfer office overhead costs. 135 Finally, the remaining amount
(approximately one-third of the revenue) would be returned to the university for use
in further research. 136 Ritchie de Larena's proposal envisions that the center would
work directly with researchers to obtain protection for new inventions. 137 The center
would also have a Board of Advisors, consisting of university, government, legal, and
industry experts, to make suggestions for commercializing the inventions. 138 The
center would also maintain a public Internet database of all university patents and their
licensing status. 139
Although Ritchie de Larena's proposal is very appealing, it is not specifically
directed towards overcoming three barriers to successful exploitation of patents by the
university. First, it does not suggest an intellectual property management strategy.
Second, it does not provide the university with the bows and whys of patent acquisition
and exploitation. Third, it does not provide the vital infrastructure necessary to create
an effective technology transfer office, even though it does provide a structure to assist
with developing relationships between businesses and universities for licensing
purposes. To address these particular concerns, I propose both a primer and a structure
that adapt and promote the strategies and behaviors set forth in Rembrandts, leading
to effective acquisition and exploitation of inventions, and in turn, reduced obstacles
to research.

B. A Patent Acquisition and Exploitation Primer for Universities
There are three main points a university will need to address to establish and
implement a successful intellectual property management strategy which, as will be
explained below, should promote research and innovation by alleviating the funding
and access obstacles. First, a university needs to embrace patenting and seek patents
generously. Second, a university needs to create a patent management strategy that
reflects the objectives of the institution. Third, a university needs to implement an
infrastructure that permits the execution of the established strategy, a topic covered in
Part C below.

13 I.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

!d.
!d. at 75.
Id.
!d.
/d.at76.
!d.
!d. at 77-78.
!d. at 78.
!d.
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I. Embrace Patenting
A university needs to allocate resources to enable the institution to embrace and
generously seek patents, and further to educate its scientists about the patenting process
(with the hopes of encouraging the acceptance of patenting on the research side of the
academy). At the next level, the university's technology transfer office will need to
analyze inventions to determine how they fit within the .university's overall patenting
scheme to generously, but intelligently, seek patent protection. The concern about
allocating resources is understandable; with dwindling state budgets and wildly
expanding college tuition costs, universities are particularly sensitive about spending
money on an endeavor that is not directly related to education or research. One way
to manage this is to try to make the technology transfer office somewhat self-funding,
that is, revenue from licensing may support the operations of the technology transfer
office, including the costs of acquiring patents, overhead, and personnel. (This also
provides a side benefit ofincentivizing the technology transfer office to actively, not
passively, license the university's patent assets in order to generate sufficient funds for
its support.)
To further encourage the university's embracing of patenting, the technology
transfer office will need to address the current divide between the scientists and the
business side of intellectual property. On a pragmatic level, researchers need to
understand the importance ofsubmitting their research to the technology transfer office
at an early stage; they also need to be aware of how their presentation and publication
activities may affect the patentability of inventions. On a socio-cultural level, the
issues may be addressed head-on, with the eventual hopes of convincing researchers
to embrace patenting, by creating a team atmosphere between the technology transfer
office and the researchers and by educating the researchers about the benefits of
patents.
The task of analyzing inventions to fit within the university's patent management
strategy, and to generously but strategically seek patent protection, is much more
difficult. As discussed previously, in a business, most of the inventions will either be
the core technology of the company or will be related to or driven by this core
technology. For this reason, the intellectual property department of a business will be
able to readily identify how a new invention fits within the general strategy and scheme
for the company. In the university setting this is not the case because inventions can
come from a myriad of technology areas and there is no general sense of staying within
a singular type of inventions. Moreover, the trajectory of research, even within a
discrete department in the university, may change over time, depending on the faculty
makeup, the outside funding available, and the popular trends of research. Thus, part
of the intellectual property strategy for a university technology transfer office is to not
just embrace patenting, but to create some sort of strategy for determining which
inventions to acquire patent rights for and on which patents to actively pursue
licensees.

2. Patent Management Strategy
Next, the university needs to create a patent management strategy that reflects its
objectives. In business, the primary objectives are most often to 1) strengthen
proprietary market advantage; 2) improve financial performance; and 3) enhance

2007]

REMBRANDTS IN THE RESEARCH LAB

431

competitiveness. 140 Translating these objectives to the university setting does not
require much alteration. In fact, university administrators are unlikely to complain
about achieving any or all of these objectives. To be precise, however, a university's
objectives must include university specific issues. Improving financial performance
can take on many faces at the university. Financial performance can be boosted
directly by funneling revenue into the school in the form of licensing fees, or similarly,
by attracting more students and their tuition dollars. Indirectly, financial performance
can be improved by decreasing the outlays required by the university, such as by
attracting grants to fund research (so the university then does not need to fund as many
projects). In a related vein, the university also wants to enhance competitiveness,
which in the currency of universities includes prestige, which again lures more and
better students, faculty, and funding. The first objective, strengthening a proprietary
market advantage, does not have a precise analog with respect to the university. One
way to think about this may be as strengthening the university's research advantages.
This can include increasing grant and licensing revenue, permitting and promoting a
wide variety of research, and attracting top talent in both the faculty and student ranks.
The question then becomes how the university can exploit its intellectual property
assets to achieve these defined objectives. The grow-fix-sell triage proposed by
Rembrandts can be easily adapted for use in a university setting. 141 At the outset, the
university must audit (both initially and at regular intervals) its patent portfolio and
determine what inventions and what technology sectors are suited for seeking potential
licensees. This is difficult, to be sure, since the inventions will be from diverse sectors
of technology with little rhyme or reason and no single product line to tie advances to.
It will also be difficult because university technology transfer offices are unlikely to
have sufficient skill or knowledge in each and every area in which inventions are being
submitted. If this hurdle can be surmounted, using the proposal below for altering the
makeup of the technology transfer office, the technology transfer office can then apply
the grow-fix-sell triage system, again with some modifications.
In the business setting, patents tagged for growth have been identified as being
primed for development into new product lines or expansion into new markets. 142
These activities do not have a direct correlation in the university setting for two
reasons. First, universities are frequently developing new inventions or product lines
in a vast array of scientific areas, and so developing a new product line or expanding
into new markets is not a terribly useful metric. Second, one of the major complaints
against university patenting is the notion that it brings a level of commercialization that
interferes with academic freedom. 143 To then target research to specifically develop
a new product line would exacerbate this problem. At least initially in the university
setting, the real growth should be increasing patent acquisition and encouraging
relationships with potential licensees. The university should also focus on using its
intellectual property assets to grow its academic capital and further its goals of
education and research. However, as the sophistication level ofthe technology transfer

140.
141.
142.
143.

RIVETIE & KLEIN, supra note 14, at 64-65.
!d. at 124-36.
/d.at68-77.
See supra text accompanying notes 45-48.
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office increases, it can endeavor to focus more like a business and seek new product
lines or markets for its inventions. The sticking point is that the technology transfer
office will unlikely be in the position to have the requisite information. The structure
proposed below addresses this issue.
In the business setting, patents are identified in the fix category if they fall within
areas of slowing growth or in cluttered or eroding markets. 144 The business will need
to see if the intended use for this patent can be "fixed"--can the patent somehow be
relevant in the slower market? Because universities will likely be only in the licensing
market (as opposed to making or manufacturing a product themselves), the fix category
is not so relevant. However, to give this category relevance in the university setting,
the fix category can be composed of patents for which licensing efforts have been
made, but failed, and where these patents are viewed as having future licensing or other
potential. Rather than simply releasing the invention to the public domain or otherwise
failing to exploit the patent, the technology transfer office faced with this situation
needs to think outside the box in search of other uses or applications for the
technology, at least until the future licensing opportunities become a reality.
In the business setting, the sell patents are fairly self-explanatory. These are the
patents that are no longer useful and have no perceivable value going forward. 145 The
point is then simply to get the most economic or strategic value from the sale of the
dying business. 146 Universities do not often (and in fact are usually bound not to) sell
their intellectual property assets and must rely on licensing. 147 However, the
identification of these patents in the sell category may indicate which patents need to
be pruned from the active licensing set or which patents need not be maintained (as a
maintenance fee is required at regular intervals to keep a patent in force). The
difference between the fix patents, which have no licensees, and sell patents, which
also have no licensees, is that the fix patents have some perceivable future value at the
time of assessment. Looking at these sell patents, there is no ascertainable future use,
no outside-the-box functions that render keeping the patent relevant. These patents
should be sold or no longer maintained by the university.
In summary, in the grow mode, the technology transfer office needs to be
concerned with connecting what is being done in the university with what is being done
in industry. In fix mode, the technology transfer office needs to be concerned with the
immediate issue of determining whether each particular patent asset has visible or
imaginable value. If not, then the technology is demoted to the sell category. The
biggest problem is that most, if not all, university technology transfer offices are not
equipped to understand and analyze the trends ofbusiness and technology. 148 The next
section provides a proposal to improve the technology transfer office's capability to
handle these tasks.

144. !d. at 77.
145. !d. at 81.
146. Id. at 133-36.
147. In particular, the Bayh-Dole Act only authorizes, and in fact encourages, licensing. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 200, 202, 204 (2007). See also, Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti K. Rai, Harnessing and Sharing the
Benefits ofState-Sponsored Research: Intellectual Property Rights and Data Sharing in California's Stem
Cell Initiative, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1187, 1197 (2006).
148. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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C. A Proposed Infrastructure and Structure
Ultimately, the key to implementing and executing the previously described patent
management strategy is equipping the technology transfer office with the tools it needs
to succeed. Part of this solution must come from within the office itself; it must be
appropriately staffed to perform the required functions. However, because of the
unique situation of the university and its diverse range of inventions, it is not feasible
(or perhaps not even possible) for the technology transfer office to be responsible for
all of the required knowledge. For example, to identify potential licensees or to
determine whether a patent has an imaginable future value, a technology transfer office
will need to be knowledgeable about the trends for research and commercialization in
the field ofan invention; however, with the myriad variety of inventions springing from
university research, a technology transfer office simply cannot reasonably be charged
with detailed knowledge of each sector. Thus, I suggest changes in the structure of the
technology transfer office and further propose a new structure, outside the university,
to facilitate the technology transfer office in implementing the above detailed patent
management strategy.
Currently, most technology transfer offices are staffed by a few attorneys or
possibly a few business people. 149 A few technology transfer offices are lucky enough
to have some scientific expertise on staff. 150 The most fortunate offices may have a few
of each of these types of employees. No matter what the combination of employees,
it is nearly impossible for the technology transfer office to have sufficient
understanding in each of the various research areas in which patents are being obtained
to perform the necessary analytic tasks. Although the proposed structure described
below-the University Patent Resource Center (UPRC)-goes a long way to solving
this problem, the composition of the technology transfer office staff must be a primary
consideration. I propose three main policies for staffing a technology transfer office
to ensure that it is capable of performing the tasks described above: 1) each office
must include at least one patent attorney on staff; 2) each office must include some
significant portion of the staff that has scientific knowledge; and 3) each office must
have at least one business person on staff.
First, there must be at least a patent attorney on the staff of the technology transfer
office. Depending on the volume of inventions generated by the university and the
number of attorneys employed by the technology transfer office, the lawyer can draft
and prosecute patent applications at the Patent Office or can supervise the same
activities performed by external law firms or law student interns (or some combination
of the three). The attorney should also be responsible for at least reviewing, if not
drafting, the patent licensing agreements. Finally, but certainly not least, the attorney
must oversee the education of scientists at the university about important patent-related
issues, such as submitting inventions disclosures, maintaining and corroborating

149. Of course, any smoothly functioning administrative office will have a sufficient number of support
staff, such as secretaries or paralegals. I in no way diminish the importance of these types of employees
by their omission; rather, I am trying to make a point with respect to the "professional" staffing of
technology transfer offices.
150. See supra note 74.
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research notebooks, and avoiding patent-barring activities related to presentations and
publications.
Second, the technology transfer office must include a significant number of staff
members with scientific knowledge. For this aspect, I propose using graduate students
in a variety of specializations to serve semester or year-long terms as assistants to the
technology transfer office, rather than as teaching assistants for that time period. lSI
These graduate students will be better able to understand the science presented in the
inventions and have some idea, based on their own knowledge and available reports
on industry trends, how each invention might be utilized in industry and how the
invention fits within the university's growing patent portfolio. The reason that
graduate students are proposed to fill this task is manifold. First, these students are
likely to be up to date in their knowledge of the cutting edge directions in their field.
Second, by virtue of being scientists, the graduate assistants will have an ability to
understand scientific inventions not immediately within their research areas, at least
at a basic level. Third, these students, working as graduate assistants, can provide
valuable work for reasonable compensation. Further, because the graduate students'
salaries will be low, the technology transfer office will be able to employ a larger
number of these students, thereby representing a greater number of technology areas
present within the university. Finally, the exposure that the graduate assistants have
to the technology transfer process early in their careers may indoctrinate them into the
new academic mindset, where patenting is done as a matter of course, thereby changing
the culture and relationships between science and patents.
Third, there needs to be at least one business person on staff at the technology
transfer office. This person needs to understand typical industry analyses and reports,
serve as a liaison and negotiator between the university and industry (and possibly
between the technology transfer office and the university administration), and assist in
developing strategic plans for intellectual property acquisition and exploitation.
Moreover, this person, along with the attorneys and graduate assistants, will need to
think outside the box with respect to the patents designated for growth or fixing.
Because the business person will not need to be intimately familiar with the details of
the science, this person will have a better view of the overall picture and can provide
an industry level insight that may not be available from the scientists or attorneys.
Populating the university technology transfer office with persons having the skills
necessary to enable the office to perform tasks indicated in the patent management
strategy proposed above goes a long way toward fixing many of the barriers associated
with entering the patent arena; nevertheless, a knowledge deficit that will hamper the
ability of the technology transfer office to succeed remains. For this reason, I suggest
supplementing the redesigned technology transfer offices with an entity, or structure,
that is independent of the university but works in conjunction with it. The entity will
provide a number of advantages for the university, including creating and fostering

151. Some universities have implemented some aspects of this model. See, for example, the University
of Virginia Patent Foundation's graduate student internship program. More information is available at
http://www.uvapf.org/index.cfm/fuseaction/viewpage/page_id/1 06?CFID= 1302319&CFTOKEN= 1762
4305& (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
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relationships between industry and business and providing information to the university
in the form of analysis of industry, research, and patenting trends. 152
The UPRC will be charged with first creating and maintaining a database of all
university patents. The database will be available online, for a fee, to universities and
industry. However, the UPRC will not simply function as a database administrator or
aggregator. The UPRC will also provide reports and analyses to universities based on
data available to, or gathered by, the UPRC, such as information about patenting trends
or development directions in academia or industry. Different types of organizations
will have different access rights to the database, as well as to the value-added
information, such as the trend reports.
Rather than viewing the system as a simple database, a more apt analogy might be
a high-level nanny-matching system. In a database model, a nanny-matching system
may simply allow users to access a list of nannies looking for work or possibly search
the list based on desired criteria. However, a high-level nanny-matching system would
provide additional functions beyond just a database. For example, the high-level
nanny-matching system may provide additional information, such as the results of
background checks, as well as additional related services, such as paying employment
taxes on the family's behalf. The system can also provide additional information,
education, and services for the nanny, such as providing first aid training.
Furthermore, the high-level nanny-matching system may take advantage of the data
contained in its database to provide additional data. For example, the system can
provide information to aspiring nannies in the form of trends for hiring--e.g., perhaps
the trend in the Northeast United States is toward hiring nannies, while the Midwest
market for nannies is cooling off, or maybe the trend is toward hiring nannies that have
college degrees or speak multiple languages. The monetary exchange for this system
may permit nannies, as the resource-poor party, to insert their data into the database
for free or for a nominal cost. The seeking family, as the resource-rich party, will be
charged either a flat fee to search the database of willing nannies and/or may be
charged a royalty-type amount, such as a finder's fee in the amount of two times the
nanny's weekly salary, upon hiring the nanny. Another feature is that different users
may have different access to the database. Members of the general public may have
limited capabilities to search the database, for example, limited to seeing a truncated
listing of families seeking nannies and aspiring nannies. Nannies that have paid a
nominal fee may have greater access to view information about families seeking
nannies. Similarly, families seeking nannies that have paid a fee may be able to get full
details on each of the potential employees as well as access to the additional services
described.
I propose that the UPRC be a university patent database having similar valueadded, multi-user-level characteristics to the high-level nanny-matching system
described above. For a nominal fee, the university would be encouraged (or required)

152. Although this entity shares some resemblance to Ritchie de Larena's proposal, detailed above, the
value of this proposal is that it does not merely suggest an aggregator or matchmaker between industry and
academia, but instead provides the valuable information that technology transfer offices do not have ready
access to. Ritchie de Larena's proposal also addresses the underreporting of patenting by universities under
the Bayh-Dole Act-a worthy goal, but one not relevant to this paper.
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to list its patents with the UPRC and in return would be permitted to access the
database to search for other university research in similar areas. This capability will
provide the technology transfer office with the ability to do simple patent searching to
assist with making decisions about filing patent applications on new inventions. In
fact, depending on how sophisticated the UPRC becomes, it may even offer the service
of patent searching to universities for an additional fee. Also, with respect to the
university, the UPRC will provide reports and analyses about trends in patenting by
universities, as well as trends in industry and research. This information will help the
technology transfer office have sufficient knowledge to identify potential partners or
licensees in industry, as well as data to assist with performing the grow-fix-sell triage
as modified above. For industry, the database of university patents would also be
available for a cost. Access to the database will permit a business to, in one location,
be able to identify universities holding patents available for licensing. Other future
directions for the UPRC may include creating citation networks to identify important
patents and tracking royalty rates and other industry metrics.
Between the reorganization of the technology transfer office and the creation of
the UPRC, the university technology transfer office should be sufficiently equipped to
perform the required tasks to effectively execute a patent management strategy. If the
office can get to this stage, where it is regularly, efficiently, and effectively exploiting
its patent assets, the result should be decreased obstacles to research, the ultimate goal
of this proposal.
D. How Does this Proposal Address the Concerns?
The two obstacles to university research are lack of funding and lack of access.
At its best, revenue from patent licensing will generate funding, alleviating the funding
obstacle, which can then be used to bring about improved access, alleviating the access
obstacle. However, university patents cause concerns in their own right-the fear that
patenting of foundational research will prohibit innovation and that academic freedom
is lost in the growing commercialization of university research. My proposal for
equipping the university technology transfer office with the appropriate staffing and
the data necessary to implement and execute a patent management strategy addresses
these obstacles and other concerns on a number of levels. On a superficial level, any
strategic plan for intellectual property revenue is going to increase the probability of
receiving a revenue stream because efforts to license become active, rather than
passive. The key to licensing-finding the right partner-will be aided by the
revamped technology transfer office staff, as well as by the data and analysis provided
by the UPRC. As noted above, any increase in licensing revenue will decrease the
university's lack of funding, because the cost oflicensing is minimal.
With respect to access, the UPRC will provide vital information about who has
rights in various technologies and materials required by the university to forward its
research agenda. By lowering the transaction costs of identifying parties holding
relevant intellectual property rights, the university will be able to seek licenses, where
necessary, to permit its research to go forward. Ideally, instead of cash licenses,
universities will cross-license their research to each other. The UPRC also provides
the university with data to engage in discussions with members of industry that would
enhance the collaborative partnership and encourage innovation.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the prevailing wisdom is that university patenting is bad, I argue that if
done correctly, it can actually be a boon to university research. The main obstacles to
research are lack of funding and lack of access. Instead of eschewing patents on
institutional research, the university must patent strategically, like a business, and then
exploit those patents. In doing so, the university should be able to generate revenue,
which alleviates both the funding and the access problems. Further, by building a
portfolio of patents, the university can mitigate the access problems associated with
patents held by others via cross-licensing opportunities.
Universities are not strategically pursuing or exploiting their patent rights. In fact,
many universities do not even have an intellectual property management strategy. The
first step in creating a plan is to determine what to patent. Next, the university needs
to determine how to best exploit their assets. By adopting the grow-fix-sell triage of
businesses to meet the peculiar needs of universities, I believe that universities can in
fact function like businesses.
University technology transfer offices, however, are not equipped to behave like
a business at this point. I argue that two changes can improve the situation. First, the
technology transfer office needs to be appropriately staffed, which requires the
employment of at least an attorney and a business person. I further argue that the use
of graduate students as scientific assistants in the technology transfer office provides
benefits to the office, in terms of science-knowledgeable employees, as well as to the
graduate assistant, in terms of being exposed to the patent system and its benefits at an
early stage in his career. Second, an entity, the UPRC, needs to be established to serve
as a university patent database and, more importantly, a provider of data reports and
analyses. This information will help the technology transfer office to make an
informed decision, based on knowledge of the trends and directions of industry and
research-information that businesses, by virtue of being "in business," have readily
available.

